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1. Introduction 
During the entire post World War II period the international monetary and financial system has 
been shaped to a significant degree by the United States of America having the status of the 
leading economic power. An impressive indication of this superiority is the US dollar acting as the 
only currency of outstanding international importance. Despite the fact that the Deutsche mark and 
the Japanese yen internationally gained ground in the course of the last two decades the US dollar 
was ahead by a wide margin and the US acted as the only economy that had to a considerable 
degree to cope with both the beneficial and the disadvantageous effects emanating from the 
issuance of an international currency. The process of European integration and especially the 
introduction of the euro as the single currency for up to now 12 member countries of the EU in 
1999 may alter this clear currency hierarchy. The euro area is comparable in size to the US with 
respect to GDP and even exceeds the US regarding the share in world trade. Thus questions arise 
of whether the international monetary system turns out to be bipolar in the long run or whether the 
yen can also play its part. 
No accepted theoretical framework is yet existent to clarify which conditions will be sufficient to 
reach the status of a major international currency. Traditionally, trade relations, GDP but also 
inertia with respect to the use of a certain currency as a medium of exchange and a store of value 
have been mentioned as factors to explain the international role of a currency. In view of 
globalization with worldwide almost completely liberalized capital flows liquid and sophisticated 
financial markets are now overwhelmingly seen as yet another crucial precondition for a currency 
to play a significant international role. This is especially important after the start of EMU making 
the US and the euro area economies of comparable economic size. A deeper look at the 
developments of European financial markets is then indispensable since their pure aggregation may 
be deceptive in the light of still prevailing barriers to truly integrated financial markets in Europe. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the functions, benefits, and costs of a leading 
international currency are discussed. In section 3 key determinants for the continuous dominance 
of the US dollar are analysed in order to assess the sustainability of this regime. Since it turns out 
that highly developed financial markets are of special importance section 4 takes a closer look at 
the integration of European financial markets emphasizing the enormous structural changes that 
came about since the euro has been established in 1999. The comparatively weak international 
status of the yen, currently ranked third, is briefly sketched in section 5. In the last section we sum 
up our findings by trying to assess how the future currency regime most probably will look like. 
2. Functions, benefits, and risks of an international currency 
A sound institutional frame allowing for a dynamic development of international financial markets in 
the future requires an appropriate design of the underlying currency regime. Under the Bretton 
Woods system fixed exchange rates to be defended within narrow limits made monetary 
authorities and national governments play a dominant role. Today, in a world of almost completely 
free international capital movements and exceptionally high turnovers on foreign exchange markets 
that sum up to a daily average of 1.5 trillion dollar (BIS, 1999), central banks may no longer be 
capable of successfully intervening on these markets. In a study on the continuously decreasing 
success of foreign exchange market interventions by central banks Anna J. Schwartz states: 
“Experience has disillusioned them.” (Schwartz, 2000, p. 1). Billions of dollars are rapidly moved 
and removed from one place to another. Countries being particularly dependent on (short term) 
 3
foreign capital can easily be faced with drastic (long term) economic consequences. 
Especially short-term oriented investors that are repeatedly blamed for their alleged destabilizing 
speculation, may withdraw their capital as soon as possible if expected risk-adjusted returns fall in 
one country and rise somewhere else. Governments, therefore, are forced to adjust their 
economic policy to avoid a sudden outflow of foreign capital resulting from unsustainable policies 
in the respective country.1 In this sphere of the “new structure of power” (Cohen, 1998) 
governments have to share their monetary power with international financial markets, the latter 
now serving as a strong monitor for national economic policies and reducing their range of 
activities.2 
Functions of an international currency 
The change in the international financial framework sketched above calls for a more detailed 
analysis. In particular, the decisions of participants in international markets to use a certain 
currency are of interest. In table 1 three key functions of the use of a currency outside the issuing 
country are presented. The functions of an international currency correspond to the classical 
functions of (national) money: medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value. In 
addition, the private use of money can be distinguished from its official use. 
 
Table 1: Functions of an international currency 
Function Private use Official use 
Medium of exchange Vehicle currency Intervention currency 
Unit of account Quotation currency Pegging currency 
Store of value Investment/ Financing currency Reserve currency 
Source: Hartmann (1998) and Detken and Hartmann (2000). 
Hartmann (1998) defines a currency to be an international one, if private or official agents that 
both reside abroad make significant use of at least one out of the six functions in table 1. To get an 
overall view of a currencies’ degree of internationalization one could be tempted to analyse each 
of the functions given in table 1. Yet, in this paper we focus on private currency use since on 
foreign exchange markets power shifted away from official action towards international market 
forces. So we primarily deal with the vehicle, the quotation, and the investment/financing functions 
of international currencies. The functions of a currency are of course intertwined rather than firmly 
separated. Therefore, it is not conducive to purely analyse each for the sake of completeness. 
Instead, the different functions concerning the private use of international currencies are selectively 
taken up during the discussion in sections 3 to 5 when discussing the respective role of the dollar, 
the euro, and the yen.3 
Benefits 
One major direct and indisputable economic benefit of the widespread international use of a 
currency in favour of the issuing country is international seigniorage. As soon as foreigners are 
willing to hold an international currency for transaction and portfolio purposes they exchange no 
                                                 
1 During the 1997/98 currency crisis, for instance, Asia had to experience this. Some South-East Asian 
countries, though, recovered in terms of GDP growth rates in 1999 and 2000. 
2 Cohen adds to his view of a shifting structure of power that cross-border competition has not so much 
diminished as transformed the role of the state (Cohen, 1998, chapter 7). 
3 For a detailed investigation of each function see Hartmann (1998). 
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interest-bearing money for their own interest-bearing securities, so that a net gain for the issuing 
central bank occurs.4 For the US this gain is estimated to amount to about 0.1% of GDP per year. 
Another economic benefit is a liquidity premium on interest rates, which Portes and Rey (1998, p. 
309) label “another, often neglected source of seigniorage”. According to them the comparatively 
high share of US government securities held by non-residents denotes a disproportionate 
international demand for dollar-denominated US debt. Because of this, i.e. the US dollar serving 
as an international investment currency, interest payments for outstanding debt are lower. Portes’ 
econometric work as well as estimates from market participants show that the interest rate 
liquidity premium amount to at least 25 basis points adding another estimated yearly flow of 0.1% 
of GDP to the seigniorage mentioned above (Portes, 2000). 
Further efficiency gains result from liquid and sophisticated financial markets in the domain of the 
currency predominantly used. In that case transaction costs in foreign exchange and securities 
markets tend to be lower and, in addition, a broad maturity spectrum and a wide array of 
innovative financial products improve the risk-management and the unbundling of risks for private 
actors. In their “big euro” scenario Portes and Rey (1998) expect the benefits for the euro area 
resulting from a reduction of transaction costs to be equal to the combined gains of seigniorage 
and “liquidity discount”, amounting to a further 0.2% of GDP.5 Added together, annual benefits of 
0.4% of GDP may solely be attributed to the role of an outstanding international currency 
(corresponding to a “big dollar” or “big euro” scenario). 
Some examples may illustrate these gains. Within the country that issues an international currency 
consumers face lower transaction costs for exchanging cash due to relatively narrow bid-ask 
spreads. Companies gain from a widely accepted invoicing currency by reducing their costs of 
currency conversion and exchange rate risk management. Hedging costs deriving from foreign 
exchange exposures (claims and liabilities) have then to be born by their counterparts residing in 
countries having no international currency. A well known example is the disadvantage of Airbus 
Industries with respect to Boeing in this field. Existing market rules force Airbus Industries to 
invoice its products in US dollar whereas its costs are mainly denominated in euro. Unanticipated 
fluctuations in the euro-dollar rate thus inevitably lead to volatility of Airbus profits since the dollar 
proceeds have to be exchanged for euro. Therefore, risk exposure or hedging costs are solely the 
problem of Airbus Industries - a lucid competitive advantage for Boeing. 
Another example relates to the competitive position of the financial services industry. Here 
microeconomic benefits result from the privilege of large international investment banks to be 
located in a country having an international currency. Empirical evidence shows that financial 
institutions residing within the country that issues an international currency dominate the 
international primary bond market. The Bank for International Settlement (BIS) presents market 
shares of bookrunners whose nationality matches the currency of issue and compares these figures 
with the market shares of bookrunners that share the nationality with the borrower, both for the 
EU-11 and the US. The results for 1996-98 reveal that “historically the nationality of the 
underwriter of an international bond has been more closely associated with the currency in which 
the bond is issued than with the nationality of the borrower.” (BIS, 2000, p. 131). Again, this 
means a competitive advantage for the US, i.e. for their corporate financial services industry. 
                                                 
4 The use of Deutsche mark for example is presently widely spread all over Middle- and Eastern Europe. It 
serves as a second national currency in Bosnia and Montenegro. Therefore, the Deutsche Bundesbank 
earned parts of its profit abroad. 
5 In the “big euro” scenario the US dollar only dominates the dollar-yen market, whereas the euro is dominant 
on the euro-yen and the euro-dollar markets. 
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According to Steinherr “in no other industry has the United States been as resolutely superior as in 
the financial industry.” (Steinherr, 1998, p. 29). 
However, trying to quantitatively assess those indirect economic benefits is very difficult. Similar to 
the role of English as a lingua franca, the widespread use of the US dollar as an international 
vehicle, quotation, and investment currency contributes to the worldwide establishment of 
American practices of business, capital market rules and accounting standards. Feldstein holds the 
view that “the Anglo-American common law rules, corporate governance principles and 
accounting standards improve the efficiency with which capital is invested.” (Feldstein, 2000a, p. 
1). As a consequence of the growing acceptance of this position other countries trying to set their 
own rules might soon be confronted with penalties from foreign investors since their regulations are 
not in line with international, i.e. American arrangements. Therefore, the role of the dollar as the 
dominant international currency helps the US to make their own regulations international economic 
standards while the costs of adjusting to these rules are imposed on all other countries. 
Risks 
In turning to the risk side of having an international currency mainly two issues emerge. First, 
negative welfare effects of supplying an international currency may arise if the national central bank 
gets under pressure to serve as an international lender of last resort. Being the provider of reserves 
to the international financial system the prevention of a collapse of a major single bank or a crisis 
of the whole banking system may turn out to be costly. At the same time, however, this confers 
political power on the international lender as shown e.g. by the “key role of the US Treasury 
alongside the IMF in the Mexican crisis, the Asian crisis, and Brazil.” (Portes, 2000, p. 2). 
Second, the large quantity of an international currency held outside the country of issuance may 
blur domestic monetary policy. In 1995, for instance, 70% of total dollar cash (outside banks) vs. 
20% of total Deutsche mark cash was held abroad.6 The demand for money by non-residents – 
originating e.g. from dollarized economies in Latin America like Brazil or Argentina - is potentially 
more unstable than the domestic money demand. Monetary strategies of many central banks 
(among them the ECB) put strong emphasis on a reliable forecast of monetary aggregates. Shifts 
in and out of an international currency mainly by non-residents will bring about a higher volatility of 
shifts in the quantity of money and thus cause problems for the conduct of a monetary policy 
oriented towards price level stability. It has been exactly for this reason that the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan were hesitant to allow for a wider international use of their 
currencies. The Bundesbank was afraid of inflationary potentials that could unfold in a scenario of 
a depreciating Deutsche mark in the wake of strong and abrupt sales of this currency. Under such 
circumstances monetary policy decisions may become unintentionally constrained by the need to 
discourage abrupt switches into other currencies. 
Yet, from a political perspective, the omnipresence of the dollar creates undisputable benefits for 
the US - besides the purely symbolic and psychological meaning of possessing a world currency. 
Several further political repercussions are pointed out by Cohen: “Domestically, the hegemon is 
better insulated from outside influence or coercion in formulating and implementing policy. 
Abroad, it is better able to pursue foreign objectives without constraint as well as to exercise a 
degree of influence or coercion to others.” (Cohen, 1998, p. 128f). 
To sum up, the status of an international currency indeed matters. Significant, not negligible gains 
have to be balanced against potentially small, more indeterminate losses. Recent policy clearly 
confirms that the US want to preserve their dominant position while the EU and East-Asia made a 
political effort, especially with respect to financial market liberalization and economic integration, 
                                                 
6 These figures are presented in Rogoff (1998). 
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to make the euro resp. the yen more competitive with the dollar. In Japan, for instance, even an 
official “Study Group for the Promotion of the Internationalization of the Yen” was formed in 
September 1999. Apparently, in the view of political authorities the potential gains would 
outweigh potential losses. 
3. The status quo: Factors determining the dominance of the US dollar 
From a historical perspective the dominance of the US dollar today partly can be explained by 
former accommodating institutional settlements. The transition from pound sterling to the US dollar 
as the leading international currency in the first half of the last century took place rather slowly and 
was finally pushed by the creation of the Bretton Woods System in 1944. Rey (1999) shows that 
pound sterling remained the dominant international currency as long as Great Britain’s foreign 
trade exceeded the corresponding volume of the US. Despite the fact that already in 1870 the US 
had surpassed the UK in terms of economic size (measured by GDP) it took the dollar more than 
half a century to replace the pound as the international key currency. “Only after World War II 
did the exports of the US overtake significantly the exports of the UK. These data are consistent 
with our result that trade flows are the key determinants of internationalization of currencies, as 
opposed to economic size.” (Rey, 1999, p. 26f). 
According to Kindleberger (1973) the long transition period in which the pound started to loose 
its dominant role as international currency without being instantly replaced by the US dollar caused 
a vacuum of international leadership at the wake of the Great Depression in 1929. Neither the 
Bank of England nor the US Federal Reserve assumed the responsibility needed to fight instability 
on international financial markets. Not before the end of World War II the US had the power and 
the political will to design a new international financial order that eventually paved the way for an 
era of unprecedented economic growth.7 
The Bretton Woods System institutionalised the role of the US dollar as the major international 
currency. In order to reduce financial instability as experienced during the Great Depression the 
classical Gold Standard was substituted by a fixed exchange rate regime pegging all currencies to 
the dollar and installing a dollar-gold link. Such regulations were perfectly in line with the widely 
accepted view that an institutional settlement allowing for active intervention would be most 
efficient to control volatile and erratic moves of markets. But the envisaged stabilizing effect of 
fixed exchange rates turned out to be a problem when rapid economic recovery in West Germany 
and Japan would have required consecutive devaluations of the US dollar. Because international 
coordination about adequate realignments failed due to diverging economic interests the 
sustainability of that regime was undermined. When the Bretton Woods system finally broke down 
in 1972 the new regime of floating exchange rates seemed to put an end to the privileged position 
of the US dollar. But even though the Deutsche mark and to a lesser extent the yen started to take 
over a few international currency functions (table 1) they never really threatened the profound 
dominance of the US dollar in this respect. 
Size, trade, and invoicing 
Following Rey’s (1999) aforementioned argument, Britain’s formerly high share in worldwide 
exports rather than its GDP accounted in great part for the international success of the pound 
sterling before World War II. But such a finding must be examined carefully before deriving 
                                                 
7 Kunz (1995) points out that “geopolitical power depends on financial power, each of which supports the 
other.” This interdependency has to be kept in mind when discussing the economics of international 
monetary and currency regimes. 
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general conclusions. Taking a look at economic size and the share in international trade in 1999 
(table 2) it stands out that the US share of world GDP (20.8%) is larger than the respective 
numbers of the euro area (15.5%) and Japan (7.5%) whereas the euro area has a considerably 
higher share of world trade (19.5%, excluding intra-European trade) than the US (15%) as well 
as Japan (8.5%). These trade figures are underlined by the fact that the euro area is more open 
(17%) than the US (11%) and Japan (9%). 
 
Table 2: Economic size, international trade, and openness 1999 
 Share of world GDP in 
% 
Share of world exports 
in % 
Openness: 
Exportsa)/ Importsa) 
EU-11 15.5 19.5b) 17b) / 15b) 
USA 20.8 15 11 / 13 
Japan 7.5 8.5 9 / 8 
Source: ECB (2000). a) As % of GDP, averages 1997-99; b) Relating to extra-area trade flows. 
 
Table 3: Invoicing of international trade 
 1980 1992 CIb) 1992 
EMS-5a) 31 33 - 
Deutsche mark 14 15 1.4 
US dollar 56 48 3.6 
Japanese yen 2 5 0.6 
Source: McCauley (1997); more actual numbers are currently not available. 
a) EMS-5: DEM, FRF, GBP, ITL, NLG; b) CI (coefficient of internationalization) = trade 
invoiced in currency x, divided by trade of country with currency x as legal tender 
Assuming that these relations remain rather stable over time and in line with Rey’s assessment that 
trade flows are most important one might suggest that we are at the edge of a switch from the US 
dollar to the euro as the leading international currency. Yet, a completely different story is told by 
the invoicing behaviour of participants in international trade (table 3). 
To reach an agreement about the unit of account used for an international transaction trade 
partners have three choices at their disposal: payment is carried out in the exporter’s, the 
importer’s or a third (vehicle) currency. If Grassman’s Law (Grassman, 1973) would fit fully - i.e. 
trade tends to be invoiced in the exporter’s currency - and if exports and imports would be 
balanced different currencies should reveal a similar coefficient of internationalization (CI). 
Though, the CI column of table 3 reveals huge differences: In 1992 the US dollar was used to 
denominate trade 3.6 times the value of US trade whereas the corresponding factor for the 
Deutsche mark was 1.4 and far below one for the yen. One has to concede that between 1980 
and 1992 the estimated share of world trade invoiced in US dollar declined significantly but to a 
certain extent this can be explained by the drop in oil prices.8 Nevertheless, dollar invoicing 
remained on a high level of 48% for the last decade. 
                                                 
8 See McCauley (1997). For a more detailed analysis of the invoicing behavior see Krugman (1992) and Cohen 
(1998). 
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Up to now a high percentage of trade between the EU-11 and non-European countries has been 
invoiced in US dollars. A lot of raw materials like oil are traded almost exclusively in US dollar 
independent of the nationality of buyers and sellers. The relatively high share of US dollar invoiced 
trade implies that the use of the dollar in international trade does not reflect the foreign demand for 
US goods. Thus, a first important outcome of our analysis is that neither a country’s absolute size 
nor its share of world trade are indicators sufficient to determine the international performance of 
its currency. 
Interaction on foreign exchange and securities markets 
In order to deepen the explanation of US dollar’s supremacy Alogouskoufis, Portes, and Rey 
(1997) developed an innovative theoretical framework by incorporating the structure of 
international financial markets into the analysis. They approached the invoicing puzzle sketched 
above for the most part from a transaction costs perspective accentuating the interaction between 
private market participants on foreign exchange (forex) and securities markets. International 
financial markets have been subject to rapid changes in recent decades. Technological progress, 
financial innovations (partly due to improved theoretical models of finance, e.g. the theory of 
option pricing by Black and Scholes, 1973) and above all reduced regulations led to an upsurge in 
the transaction volumes of financial markets. Therefore, synergy effects between securities and 
forex markets became stronger. Within this framework official actions such as the management of 
currency reserves or the choice of a certain currency regime (table 1), e.g. exchange rate pegging, 
are of secondary importance. 
On foreign exchange markets the US dollar has adopted the role of a global vehicle currency, i.e. 
it serves as the prevalent international medium of exchange. Table 4 shows that the US dollar 
accounted for more than 80% of the turnover on international foreign exchange markets in 1992 
and extended this lead to 87% in 1998 with the Deutsche mark and the Japanese yen following by 
a share of 30% and 21%, respectively (all figures out of 200%, see note in table 4). Even all EMS 
currencies taken together accounted for a turnover considerably less than the dollar. These figures 
become even more impressive when excluding intra-European forex transactions: McCauley 
(1997) estimates the share of the US dollar to rise under the assumption of European Monetary 
Union from 83% to 92% in 1995 whereas the EMS currencies would drop from 70% to 56%. 
 
Table 4: Turnover on international foreign exchange markets in % 
 April 1992 April 1995 April 1998 
EMS 70 70 / 56* 63 
Deutsche mark 40 37 / 31* 30 
US dollar 82 83 / 92* 87 
Japanese yen 23 24 / 26* 21 
Source: BIS (1999); *corrected for intra-EMS turnover, McCauley (1997); own calculations. 
Because of two currencies involved in each transaction the total of shares sum up to 200%. 
This pattern of disproportionately high dollar shares on foreign exchange markets (similar in 
magnitude to the aforementioned invoicing behaviour) favours the trading of financial assets 
denominated in the “privileged” currency. In turn, a more liquid US dollar securities market 
strengthens the role of the US dollar as a vehicle currency. Thus, a virtuous circle arises and 
enhances the liquidity of both the foreign exchange and the securities markets. A drop in 
transaction costs is the major result but simultaneously also the ultimate cause for this feed-back 
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dynamic. Alogoskoufis, Portes, and Rey (1997) developed an approach to analyse the potential 
of the euro in challenging the dollar’s international supremacy. The nucleus of their influential 
analysis consists of financial market considerations emphasizing the interaction between foreign 
exchange and securities markets, while private invoicing behaviour, official reserve management, 
and currency pegging decisions are forced to adjust. A network of financial relations is then crucial 
in explaining the strong dollar shares. In a similar framework, special features of the “new 
economy” are analysed by Shapiro and Varian: “The value of connecting to a network depends 
on the number of other people already connected to it.” (Shapiro and Varian, 1999, p. 174). 
These network externalities or demand-side economies of scale can only come up as long as a 
huge share of all transactions on foreign exchange markets is intermediated through one single 
currency (the dollar). Otherwise, it is hard to reach a critical degree of liquidity which is 
indispensable to realize the desired advantages in cost reduction. 
Financial market liquidity 
The continuous strength of the dollar until now is primarily based on the superior efficiency and 
liquidity of US dollar financial markets that long before the European and Asian markets could 
develop. They provide narrow bid-ask spreads, the ability to buy or sell larger amounts showing 
no price effects, a rich array of instruments and deep repurchase markets. To assess the 
competitiveness of different financial markets Alogouskoufis, Portes, and Rey (1997, p. 27) 
compare bid-ask spreads of benchmark government bonds (10-years to maturity). They conclude 
that transaction costs between the US and European markets differ by a factor of at least two in 
favour of the US. Another helpful indicator to evaluate the liquidity of financial markets is the ratio 
of turnover versus the amount of bonds outstanding traded on secondary markets. On US 
government bond markets in 1995 this ratio (14.0) is significantly higher than the equivalent ratios 
for Europe (9.9) and Japan (6.2). 
Similarly, as soon as the focus shifts to private equity and corporate bond markets an 
unambiguous story is told. Here US markets show up to be impressively ahead in every respect. 
The volume of issuance of commercial papers and daily trade volumes of stocks listed at the 
NYSE are several times higher than in the euro area. A good example to illustrate the international 
standing of US dollar financial markets is the auction of UMTS licenses in Germany in August 
2000.9 All companies trying to obtain one of the few “third generation” licenses offered by the 
government were soon faced with a rapidly rising need for funds they had to pay in euro 
immediately after the auction. With the total amount summing up to about 50 billion euros some of 
the companies announced to finance a part of their bill by issuing corporate bonds. On account of 
only moderately developed euro corporate bond markets they, however, had to decide to issue 
the major fraction of the bonds in dollar and exchange them thereafter for euro. Thus, only US 
dollar markets could offer the depth and breadth necessary to avoid price distortions and, hence, 
continuously rising capital costs. To sum up, the US dollar financial markets provide a unique 
degree of cost efficiency and liquidity attractive to both investors and issuers worldwide. 
Risk factors and the diminishing dominance of the US dollar 
The results reached so far stressed size factors like real activity (GDP, trade) and financial liquidity 
(inseparably connected with the transaction cost argument) as economic determinants for the 
international role of a currency. However, a convincing financial market perspective has to be 
complemented by risk factors that mainly comprise monetary stability, financial market volatility, 
                                                 
9 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 14, 2000. 
 10
and cross-country asset correlations.10 International investors, be they central banks or private 
agents, are seeking to reduce risk by diversifying their portfolios. In a world of imperfectly 
correlated interest rates and equity returns the rationale of portfolio diversification smoothens the 
tendency of one currency to become the single international currency. Though transaction costs 
might be lowest when investing and financing concentrates on only one currency, investors and 
borrowers strive for optimising the structure of their portfolios with respect to risk-return 
considerations. Via this risk effect the centripetal forces of dollar liquidity are countered to some 
extent. Standard portfolio models of capital market theory compute an extensive degree of 
diversification relating to international portfolios. In reality, however, a strong home-bias “puzzle” 
has to be resolved (i.e. the unexpected empirical evidence that international, cross-border 
diversification remains below optimal levels).11 
Another reason potentially limiting the dominance of the US dollar relates to the stability in 
monetary conditions. At the beginning of the eighties a severe economic crisis accompanied by 
historically high rates of expected inflation in the US diminished the attractiveness of the dollar as 
an international investment currency. At this time it was on the edge of not fulfilling the store of 
value function any more. Comparably low inflation rates in Germany associated with expectations 
of a further appreciation of the Deutsche mark were the result of the stability orientation and the 
unique reputation of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The mark became a ‘save heaven’ currency for 
investors to reduce their dependency on the US dollar. To a lesser extent the same applied to the 
yen. As a consequence, capital inflows enhanced the liquidity on German bond markets and finally 
led to spill over effects on German financial markets. In order to cope with the enormous demand 
for assets denominated in Deutsche mark new financial instruments and services were introduced 
to the markets. Such measures brought a rise in efficiency on financial markets making the 
Deutsche mark an even more attractive international investment currency. Within a few years the 
mark adopted the role of a junior international currency ranging far ahead of the yen and other 
currencies though still well behind the dollar. 
Due to reduced needs for intervention and a rising exchange rate volatility after the break down of 
the Bretton Woods system changes in central bank’s reserve management occurred, too. Parts of 
their foreign reserve portfolios were shifted away from US dollar assets and gold towards other 
foreign exchange reserves. European central banks linked their monetary policies to that of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. In that way the (unofficial) role of the anchor currency of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) accrued to the Deutsche mark simultaneously fostering its role as the 
second international currency. Particularly, the dollar’s presence as a vehicle currency 
intermediating between European currencies diminished for the benefit of the Deutsche mark. 
 
In this section it has been pointed out that the US dollar serves as the by far most important 
international currency primarily because of the efficiency and liquidity of US dollar financial 
markets. The prevailing regime will most probably hold at least as long as European and other 
markets cannot fully compete in this respect. This is all the more important the less size differences 
in the real sector matter. Particularly with reference to a possible catching up of the euro with the 
dollar, economists like Portes and Rey (1998), Eichengreen (2000) and Wyplosz (1999) formed 
a financial market perspective or adopted it. When analysing transaction costs on financial 
markets, Wyplosz puts his view as follows: “Of all characteristics of an international currency, the 
                                                 
10 See Detken and Hartmann (2000). 
11 See Tesar and Werner (1995) for a discussion and Danthine, Giavazzi, and von Thadden (2000) for actual 
numbers concerning the home-bias puzzle. 
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existence of wide and deep markets with low transaction costs seems to be the most crucial.” 
(Wyplosz, 1999, p. 95).12 To evaluate the potentials of the only serious aspirants, the euro and the 
yen, to challenge the position of the dollar the effects of European monetary and financial 
integration and the prospects of the yen should be examined. 
4. Catching up: The euro’s impact via European financial market integration 
Most international economists see the launch of the euro in 1999 as one of the most important 
events in the Post World War II international monetary and financial system besides the creation 
of the Bretton Woods System and its collapse in the early seventies.13 Twelve members of the 
European Union (Greece joined at the beginning of 2001) abolished their national currencies and 
delegated their monetary policy to a supranational and independent authority, the European 
Central Bank (ECB). Although the circulation of euro notes and coins will start only at the 
beginning of 2002 the new currency has completely replaced the legacy currencies from the 
outset. 
In this section we deal with the question of to what extent the euro has already triggered European 
financial markets to overcome their historically generated segmentation on the road to truly unified 
markets. Although mainly confined to intra-European markets this investigation is undertaken 
against the background of the future international potential of the euro. Evidence for the first two 
years of the euro regarding key segments of European financial markets (i.e. money, bond, equity 
markets) lead observers to speak of a “revolution in European finance” (Eichengreen, 2000, p. 
356). In the following the available evidence is reviewed. 
Before going into details three caveats should be pointed out. First, by analysing the forces at 
work that develop and integrate European financial markets problems arise how to distinguish 
between effects purely resulting from the introduction of the euro and those which would have 
happened regardless of its launch. Nonetheless, one can agree to the view that the new currency 
works at least as a catalyst for European financial market developments with the “precise role of 
EMU difficult to quantify.” (Danthine et. al., 2000, p. 3). Second, due to the East Asian financial 
crisis starting in 1997, the Russian sovereign default, and the crash of the Long Term Capital 
Management hedge fund (LTCM) both coming up during autumn 1998 international investors 
returned to a ‘save haven’ strategy focussing mainly on dollar investments. In contrast, 
international and European borrowers issued large volumes of euro-denominated bonds in the first 
year after the introduction of the euro. However, strong one-off effects played their part, since 
large companies intended to establish a benchmark position within the deeply underdeveloped 
European corporate bond market.14 Third, the long lasting slump of the euro against the dollar 
(and the yen) that after a depreciation of about 35% since its introduction came to an end only in 
October 2000. This unfavourable development most probably impeded the attraction of funds to 
European financial markets. Though, Danthine et al. (2000, p. 4), in attesting European financial 
markets an “excellent performance…despite the depreciation” play down the importance of this 
issue. Most recent BIS data on international debt securities markets show that the dollar 
recaptured its leading position on international bond markets: While throughout 1999 the euro had 
a slightly higher share of international debt issues (571 vs. 545 billions of US dollars) the dollar 
                                                 
12 Further fundamental work with respect to the euro’s impact on European and international financial markets 
has been done by McCauley (1997), McCauley and White (1997) and Prati and Schinasi (1997). 
13 See Bergsten (1997, p. 17). 
14 See Bayle et al. (2000, p. 42ff.). 
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clearly surpassed the euro by 29% during the first three quarters of 2000 (BIS, 2000b, p. 24). 
Bearing in mind these caveats a careful interpretation of the prevailing evidence will be tried in the 
following.  
I. Money markets 
European money markets rapidly expanded and established a high degree of integration 
subsequent to the adoption of the euro and the concurrent implementation of a single monetary 
policy. Already the run-up to EMU showed a considerable convergence of money market rates 
(“convergence trading”). Quite important though, for the two most significant segments of the euro 
money markets - the secured (repo) and the unsecured segment - a distinction has to be made 
with reference to their individual integration progress.15 
While the repo market demands collateralization in addition to the exchange of short-term liquidity 
the unsecured interbank market just involves the latter. National differences in procedures used 
across the numerous securities trading platforms, clearing houses, and securities settlement 
systems are the most impeding factors (OECD, 2000, p. 64) for a single repo market. By 
contrast, unsecured money markets solely require a payment system (a cash “leg”) but no 
additional securities “leg” (ECB, 2000, p. 53).16 Two main sources are held responsible for the 
speed and the high degree of integration with respect to this segment. First, after minor initial 
operational problems TARGET, the major settlement system for large-value payments in the euro 
area functions smoothly and plays a key role in facilitating the redistribution of liquidity across the 
euro area.17 The domestic share of money market activity of the largest market participants 
therefore diminished from 54% in 1998 to 40% in 1999 (ECB, 2000, p. 18). In addition, via this 
trouble-free cross-border payment facility price differentials in the prevailing national segments of 
the money market throughout the euro area have been offset by arbitrage operations. Second, two 
benchmark indices, EONIA (euro overnight index average) and EURIBOR (euro area interbank 
offered rate), have been placed in the field of the euro area money market. Immediately after the 
start of the euro they were “broadly accepted by all market participants” (ECB, 2000, p. 24) and 
for that reason created a single money market reference yield curve acting also as the backbone 
for the booming derivative market activities. In this money market “network” derivative markets 
generate a positive feed back into the spot money markets. Turnover in both segments boosted, a 
self-reinforcing process of liquidity calling liquidity emerged. 
An appropriate indicator for this development can be found in the form of a decline in money 
market transaction costs. For the three months segment one can observe continuously dropping 
bid-ask spreads of annually 10% since 1996. A comparison with the corresponding US segment 
shows approximately identical transaction costs of about 9 basis points in 1999.18 
With regard to the unsecured and the swap segments, the TARGET system in conjunction with 
the rapidly established euro area indices enabled market participants to play in a melted single 
market. Taken together, integration and standardization of all segments of European money 
markets are not yet complete. Especially in the case of the repo market further evolutions can be 
expected in order to get closer to US dimensions. 
                                                 
15 The secured and unsecured segments show a combined share of 77% of euro money market activity in 1999 
(ECB, 2000, p.15). 
16 These infrastructural problems on European securities markets are taken up below. 
17 TARGET stands for the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. 
18 See BIS (2000, p. 124). 
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II. Bond Markets 
Extensive as well as unexpected changes came about on European bond markets, especially 
concerning the corporate bond sector. The euro changeover period was characterised by the 
smooth redenomination of government bonds formerly denominated in the euro legacy currencies 
into euro-denominated bonds. New debt since then has been exclusively issued in euro. Bonds 
also have been reconventioned.19 The fundamental element of change was the removal of currency 
risk. Thus an equal risk base emerged throughout the euro area. Both investors and borrowers 
had to attune to a broader set of feasible transactions thereby increasing demand- and supply-
sided potentials of EMU bond markets.20 Former constraints to invest on a cross-border scale, 
such as currency matching rules applying to insurance companies and pension funds disappeared. 
Previous to EMU, life insurance companies in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy, for 
instance, were obliged to invest at least 80% of their total assets in their respective home currency. 
Moreover, commercial bank’s requirements for raising central bank credit through repurchase 
agreements were without exception based on national collateral. When these restrictions faded 
away the focus of market participants gradually could shift from currency risk to other risk 
characteristics such as credit and liquidity risk. A new need for portfolio diversification resulted 
from this shift entailing the expectation of the euro area home-country bias in investing and 
financing to be reduced. This prediction definitely holds not only for European bond markets but 
also for European asset markets in general. 
Government bond markets 
When analysing government bond markets in the euro area the main item is the convergence of 
yield differentials across participating economies. Is it a realistic appraisal to expect yield 
differentials to peter out completely and thus a formation of a truly integrated market that treats 
e.g. Spanish and French bonds as perfect substitutes? To tackle this question one has to examine 
the major risk components that are the reason for spreads in bond markets: fundamental (default 
or credit) risk, currency risk, and liquidity risk. Previous to monetary union existing spreads mainly 
reflected the currency risk component of bonds issued by countries that have been more inflation-
prone than stability-oriented Germany. Once the irrevocable fixing of the euro area exchange rates 
was announced in May 1998 currency risk vanished and therefore the decline in yield spreads 
already observable prior to that announcement accelerated to amounts below 40 basis points for 
bonds of two- to ten-year maturity.21 In the precedent years spreads between 200 and 400 basis 
points had been common. However, it stands out that many issuing governments even now have 
to pay a premium compared to German issues, especially concerning the German 10-year bond 
representing the key segment of the yield curve. Now that the bulk of issuance is denominated in 
euro other factors must explain interest rate spreads in the euro area. 
At first sight one might suppose fundamental risk to be responsible for remaining spreads, 
primarily because the Maastricht Treaty by means of the “no-bail-out” clause (Article 104b) 
prohibits any shared liability for debt of single EMU member countries. Yet, technical and liquidity 
reasons rather than the risk of default by a member state have been identified by market 
                                                 
19 The reconventioning encompasses, for instance, standardized rules concerning the pay and calculation of 
interest thereby turning these bonds into more comparable and substitutable assets. Most private issuers  
adapted to these rules. 
20 See Danthine et al. (2000, p. 17ff.). 
21 See BIS (2000, p. 126). 
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observers.22 In consequence, liquidity risk remains as the key factor in determining the prevailing 
yield spreads even though differences in credit risk are by no means abolished. 
An outstanding element of European financial market’s new landscape that explains the liquidity 
risk component is the enhanced competition of public debt issuers. Each government attempts to 
minimise their debt servicing costs by attracting the demand side of the market. National debt 
management agencies are forced to acknowledge investor’s surge for portfolio diversification and 
therefore are afraid of losing their traditional “home base”. Moreover, the current low-yield 
environment together with the absence of exchange rate risk forced European investors to 
diversify not only geographically but also into the corporate debt segment that offers higher risk-
return combinations. These competitive circumstances forced national Treasuries to start a “race 
to the benchmark yield curve” (Danthine et al., 2000, p. 19) providing a considerable “built-in 
liquidity” advantage for large sovereign issuers like Germany, France, and Italy. Especially the 
smaller issuers (e.g. Ireland and the Netherlands) currently undertake benchmark policies to foster 
certain maturities or innovative products (niches) since their total amount of government debt is 
too small to ensure sufficient liquidity through the whole yield curve. However, big volumes of 
outstanding and newly issued debt alone cannot account for a benchmark status. Issuance has to 
be supplemented by specific issuance procedures, market transparency as well as secondary and 
derivative market liquidity. For instance, within the two- and the ten-year sector German bonds 
are the benchmark in the latter case mutually reinforced by the turnover of the actually 
incontestable Bund future contract at Eurex, Frankfurt’s Swiss-German derivatives exchange. 
France, conversely, sets the benchmark in the intermediate five to seven-year range and for 
maturities of over ten years (ECB, 2000, p. 39). 
On the one hand the observable rivalry and the diverging issuance strategies give way for 
innovative and transparent market behaviour. On the other hand idiosyncratic national debt 
management cannot exploit the potential economies of scale only a unified market structure could 
offer and therefore will remain more costly than US Treasury’s debt management. While the US 
Treasury serves as a centre of gravity a central euro issuer is missing. Furthermore, there are 
drawbacks for other financial market segments. A well defined government (“risk-free”) yield 
curve is lacking so that the pricing of corporate bonds misses a generally accepted floor. Also, the 
market for secured short-term deposits (repo market) suffers from the deficient harmonization of 
bond market conventions.  
To summarize, the competition for liquidity and differences in credit risk bear the consequence of 
a non-unique government yield curve. Furthermore, a truly unified market in this field is hardly to 
be expected in the next future. As the BIS puts it in their last annual report: “Any argument based 
on the economic benefits of greater coordination has to be carefully weighed against the further 
erosion of national independence.” (BIS, 2000, p. 127). Additionally, according to a recent 
report prepared for the European Commission by the Giovannini Group (2000), “co-ordination 
involving a joint or single debt instrument was not regarded as a practical option for the euro area 
as a whole.” This allows for a preliminary conclusion to be drawn on the competition between the 
dollar and the euro concerning their international roles - the disadvantage for the euro is 
unambiguously evident. 
Corporate bond markets 
Right with the launch of the euro huge changes evolved for the previously underdeveloped 
European corporate bond markets and put them into a “new dimension” (ECB, 2000, p. 47). The 
first three quarters of 1999 revealed a stunning increase in euro-denominated corporate bond 
                                                 
22 See BIS (2000) and Danthine et al. (2000) for details. 
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issues (i.e. global issuance) by 390% compared to 1998.23 The doubling of the average size of 
individual corporate bond issues also documents the soared liquidity. Along with this increase of 
market depth the breadth of the market enhanced, too. Baa-rated bond issuance boosted by 
529%, however starting from a very low level, while bonds rated AA or A still rose by 55% 
respective 122% (ECB 2000, p. 39). Consequently, average credit ratings of companies that tap 
the bond market have fallen - a clear move towards US American conditions. 
Yet, one should bear in mind two important facts to qualify these figures. First, European private 
non-corporate debt issuers (i.e. banks and other financial intermediaries) in 1999 still 
outperformed corporate issuers by a factor bigger than 4 (ECB, 2000, chart 16). Second, the 
magnitude of the European corporate bond market – measured by market value of outstanding 
issues – still is merely one fifth of its US counterpart (ECB, 2000, p. 48). Notwithstanding, a 
further expansion of the European corporate bond markets is to be expected. Gros and Lannoo 
(2000) present several arguments contributing to this favourable outlook: 
· A less growing government debt market due to the Stability and Growth Pact, 
· historically low yields of government debt, 
· no constraints by formerly (bad) credit ratings of the issuers country24, and 
· lower issuing costs resulting from stronger competition between market intermediaries in a 
more liquid euro-market. 
Moreover, the merger and acquisition boom in many sectors, especially in the telecommunication 
sector, amplifies the financing needs for companies. Finally, demand-side effects also matter. 
Investors have more capital at their disposal, for instance due to gradually supplementing the pay-
as-you-go pension systems by a capital pillar in Germany and elsewhere. Even more important, as 
has been mentioned above, investors show a readiness to diversify on a geographical (cross-
border) scale as well as into riskier asset classes. 
To sum up, contrary to the sovereign debt market, European corporate bond markets were 
largely underdeveloped prior to EMU. The evidence mentioned reveals an astonishing boom that 
appears to have overcome the critical mass effect. “A broader used currency and more liquid 
capital market could attract more issues than the sum of the component currencies before, as 
seems to be the case so far in the first months of EMU.” (Gros and Lannoo, 2000, p. 44). 
Nonetheless, even considering all these factors, it might take a decade for the corporate capital 
markets in Europe to be comparable in size with its US equivalent.25 
III. Equity markets and securities market infrastructure 
The integration of European equity markets reveals an ambivalent picture. The pure magnitude, 
measured e.g. as turnover on primary and secondary markets in 1999, has grown rapidly along 
various dimensions including the successful implementation of high-tech sectors like the German 
Neuer Markt.26 A more efficient organization of the market structure and initiatives to integrate 
European equity markets, however, turned out to be less successful, as the failed merger of the 
London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse has illustrated. The latter problem, though, applies 
to the European securities markets in general because the trading, clearing, and settlement 
                                                 
23 The exact figures are €117 vs. €30 billion. See Eichengreen (2000, p. 363). 
24 Solvent companies may have a better rating than their central government. 
25 Other segments of European bond markets, e.g. the asset-backed securities market and the bond-related 
derivatives market, grew strongly, too. Especially, the German “Pfandbriefe” market established a high 
acceptance on a European scale; see ECB (2000, p. 48f). 
26 Numbers for 1999 show a 66% increase in euro equity issues and a 42% increase in European equity trading 
volume. See Danthine et al. (2000, footnote 36). 
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infrastructure still contains huge efficiency potentials. 
Against this background, it has to be asked whether the euro can promote the geographical 
diversification away from nationally oriented equity portfolios. Prior to EMU, it was generally 
expected that structural changes in equity flows would decrease the enormous equity home-bias. 
According to that logic, national impacts on share prices should diminish since now it is less 
probable that shocks emanate from national macroeconomic policies. Monetary policy is 
conducted by the ECB, fiscal policy is restricted due to the Stability and Growth Pact and 
currency risk has been eliminated. Hence, (macroeconomic) country risk would converge and thus 
the widespread strategy of managing a portfolio country-by-country should be abandoned in 
favour of a euro area-wide sector-by-sector view. In fact, to some extent this behavioural switch 
already materialized as indicated by the appearance of pan-European or euro area stock market 
indices (e.g. Stoxx-50 and Euro-Stoxx 50). The available evidence relating to a shrinking home-
bias, however, is still rather unconvincing. Danthine et al. (2000) in their thorough analysis present 
figures that support tendencies of a slow portfolio rebalancing across euro area sectors. At the 
same time, however, the Bank for International Settlement claims that “prices continue to be 
driven principally by local investors with a considerable geographical portfolio bias.” (BIS, 2000, 
133). 
Besides behavioural sluggishness, the basic issue at stake is the problem of the complex European 
trading, clearing, and settlement infrastructure.27 Notwithstanding the aforementioned mixed 
evidence regarding first steps towards portfolio rebalancing, a broad consensus exists with respect 
to the still massive (i.e. expensive) barriers to cross-border portfolio investment in the euro area. 
This fragmentation matters since it limits further integration and portfolio diversification and thereby 
impedes the development of a unified European capital market. Transaction costs resulting from 
inefficient structures impose a type of tax on trading and by that restrain investors from achieving 
optimum portfolios.28 
The case of European stock exchanges striving for alliances or cooperation serves to illustrate this 
difficulty. Overly optimistic, in June 2000 the Bank of England expressed: “The proposed merger 
between the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Deutsche Börse […] is a key step in the 
consolidation of the European exchange infrastructure, and likely to encourage further 
consolidation of clearing and settlement services.” (Bank of England, 2000, p. 7). Yet, due to 
several unsettled problems and finally induced by fears that the hostile bid of OM, a Swedish 
technology company, could be successful the LSE withdrew from their plan to fuse the two 
biggest European exchanges into iX (International Exchanges) in September 2000. Meanwhile, 
another alliance has been successfully founded in September 2000: Euronext, the merged Paris, 
Brussels, and Amsterdam exchange, is going to start business in summer 2001. These events 
reflect the competitive pressures traditional exchanges are exposed to. They are not only alarmed 
about (un)friendly takeover strategies by established exchanges but also feel challenged by newly 
emerging electronic platforms like virt-X or Jiway.29 
Beyond the missing integration in securities trading, in particular segmented European clearing and 
settlement systems are regarded as being too expensive compared to US structures. Standardized 
trading of securities requires not only a trading platform in the form of electronic or traditional 
exchanges, but also the settlement of cash and securities through clearing houses and securities 
                                                 
27 For a detailed description of the different components of the European financial infrastructure see ECB (2000, 
p. 53ff). 
28 See ECB (2000, p. 41) and Gros and Lannoo (2000, p. 67ff). 
29 See The Economist (2000). 
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settlement systems. Previous to EMU, these systems were organized nationally. Moreover, 
relating to monetary and fiscal relations, the pre-EMU legal environment was mainly built upon 
national peculiarities. Market and central bank practises together with tax and accounting regimes 
differed to a large extent. The bare introduction of the euro hardly changed this setting. Although 
the European Commission issued directives relating directly to legal issues (e.g. Investment 
Services Directive, Capital Adequacy Directive and Settlement Finality Directive), a lot of 
differences still exist. Particularly, little progress has been made concerning such key areas as 
taxing and accounting.30 
The overall picture shows that the structure of European stock exchanges is still shattered with no 
single pan-European exchange in sight. The same holds for the complete range of European 
securities infrastructure (trading, clearing, and settling). Economies of scale would call for merging 
the multiple clearing houses and securities settlement systems to one central agency because 
“settlement is the most expensive part of cross-border trading, and can cost up to ten times as 
much as in America.” (The Economist, 2000). 
The main results drawn so far in section four may best be summarized by the following statement: 
“Even after the introduction of the euro capital markets will retain a strong national flavour. 1999 
will thus see the start of a process of unification, rather than its completion.“ (Gros, 1998, p. 26f.). 
With hindsight, this forecast for the most part has been corroborated by the above presentation of 
actual developments. However, it should be kept in mind that different segments of European 
financial markets differ with respect to their pace of integration. 
IV. European monetary policy 
Besides financial market integration a sound design of European monetary policy is an 
indispensable issue when discussing the future international role of the euro. A crucial factor for a 
good performance of an international currency is whether monetary policy will be dedicated to 
price stability and therefore will gain the confidence of international investors and borrowers. With 
respect to the euro area the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB), its obligation to 
first and foremost strive for price stability and the prohibition of financing public budget deficits 
both fixed by the Maastricht Treaty are necessary conditions in this respect. Equally important is 
the validity of the Stability and Growth Pact that shall ensure a permanent upper limitation of 
public debt and deficits and even provides punishment for diverging. Only a sustained acceptance 
of this clear assignment will support an increasing international role for the euro. 
However, a political void exists when analysing the responsibility for exchange rate policy. Only 
the European Council of Ministers (and not the ECB) is authorized to initiate international 
agreements on fixed exchange rates and target zones for exchange rates (Maastricht Treaty: art. 
109) thus potentially undermining efforts taken by the ECB to defend price level stability. 
Moreover, the reputation of the ECB hinges on a convincing explanation of its monetary policy 
strategy to the actors on international financial markets and the general public. Deficits in this field 
together with debates about an appropriate degree of transparency of the ECB’s policy decisions 
arose during the first two years of EMU.31 
V. Inertia 
The analysis carried out so far suggests that the euro could catch up with the dollar in the long run. 
                                                 
30 See ECB (2000, 57ff). 
31 Problems in the broader field of macroeconomic policy are not to be discussed in this paper. One should, 
however, bear in mind that structural reforms on labour markets and the restructuring of existing pay-as-
you-go pension schemes should be of first priority in most continental European countries. 
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But forecasts about the speed of adjustment are very difficult to obtain and are likely to produce 
only poor results. Empirical knowledge tells us that economic agents are risk-averse and only 
prudently adjust their traditional behaviour to structural changes. Inertia is a reasonable assumption 
in the light of uncertainty. Though the competition between the US dollar and the euro is going to 
be finally decided on international financial markets, inertia in the behaviour of economic agents 
supports the argumentation that the catching up of the euro could be quite slow even though the 
majority of economic indicators might point into another direction. It is important to note that no 
sufficient condition exists to claim for a world currency status. Even in the situation of equal 
transaction costs, though, a switch from one currency to another could be delayed because 
uncertainty works towards sluggish behaviour. History dependency therefore matters more than 
automatism. One clearly has to distinguish between laying the institutional, economic, and political 
foundations on the one hand and convincing market participants to effectively change their 
behaviour on the other. 
Consequently, it seems to be almost impossible to make an assessment for a plausible timeframe 
as long as it remains uncertain whether a shift will occur at all. Though, Portes still holds on to link 
the possible international role of the euro directly to progresses made on European financial 
markets: “The time frame of the analysis [the euro drawing up with the dollar] is that of the 
integration of euro-area financial markets - say five to ten years” (Portes, 2000, p. 7). This 
assessment should be altered insofar as it characterizes a realistic timeframe for attaining the 
quantifiable preconditions for a leading international currency. More prudently, we join the 
opinion expressed by Wyplosz: “Finally, we are looking at a very slow process. The virtuous 
cycle of declining costs and growing market size is unlikely to unfold fast. The time-scale is 
measured in decades not in months.” (Wyplosz, 1999, pp. 88, 95). 
5. The position of the yen: Insufficient political backing 
After having evaluated the prospects of the euro as an international currency a few remarks should 
sketch the dismal prospects of the yen to join the euro in potentially competing with the dollar. 
Initially and most crucial, political conditions in Japan and East Asia are absolutely different from 
those prevailing in the European Union. Critics of the process of European integration argue that a 
lack of political unity in Europe works against a sustainable EMU.32 If one attaches importance to 
this reasoning there is practically no way for Japan to further promote the role of the yen because 
of heavy political obstacles that might arise when trying to form an East-Asian economic bloc 
comparable to the EU in this region. Due to historical burdens stemming from Japans occupations 
in other Asian countries in the first half of the 20th century cooperation between Japan, South East 
Asian countries, and perhaps China to push a pan-Asian currency (presumably the yen) must be 
regarded as exceptionally unlikely. Against this background it is all the more astonishing that in 
Japan the internationalization of the yen is announced to be an explicit political target. The latter is 
indicated by the appointment of a “Study Group for the Promotion of the Internationalization of 
the Yen” in 1999.33 
On purely economic grounds and commensurate with its clout in terms of GDP and technological 
sophistication, Japan, the second-largest world economy, would have to perform the role of an 
obvious regional leader. Though, an “unresolved issue of leadership” exists, as Grenville, the 
Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, states when considering the possibilities of 
                                                 
32 Most prominent among them is Feldstein (2000b). 
33 See Japanese Ministry of Finance (2000). 
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financial regional arrangements in East-Asia. For this reason the yen hardly has a chance to catch 
up with the dollar or the euro. A thorough analysis of Japanese respective Asian financial markets 
therefore is not useful in broadening the understanding.34 
The figures presented in section 3 (tables 2-4) as well as recent economic conditions in Japan and 
South East Asia substantiate our guarded view to the yen’s international prospects. It is worth to 
reconsider the 0.6 value for the yen’s coefficient of internationalization (table 3). This means that in 
1992 the yen was used to denominate trade by far less than the value of combined Japanese 
imports and exports. The corresponding numbers for the US dollar and the Deutsche mark are 
3.6 and 1.4, respectively. This implies that concerning the patterns of invoicing the yen is 
significantly underrepresented compared to Japan’s potency in world trade. Moreover, relatively 
intense US trade with East Asia together with the tendency of South East Asian countries to peg 
their currency to the dollar even after the currency crisis in 1997/98 prevents the yen from being 
the natural regional currency even in its “own” area. Likewise, figures on economic size, openness 
(table 2), and turnover on foreign exchange markets (table 4) strongly underscore the weak 
position of the yen if compared to the dollar and the euro (resp. its predecessor currencies). 
Additionally, deteriorations regarding the region’s economic performance in recent years should 
be noted. Japan and South East Asia still suffer from the consequences subsequent to the financial 
and economic crisis at the end of the nineties. Furthermore, Japan so far did not overcome all 
problems caused by the burst of the bubble economy in the early nineties. The growing 
indebtedness of the Japanese government (130% of GDP in 2000) due to extensive public 
spending is commonly seen as another striking problem. On this account, yen-denominated 
Japanese government bonds have been downgraded in September 2000 by Moody’s.35 Overall, 
in the foreseeable future the yen most probably cannot establish functions of an international 
currency comparable to the dollar or the euro. Even a regional dominance of the yen in East Asia 
must not be taken for granted. 
6. Outlook for the future international  currency regime 
The present currency regime privileges the US absorbing most extra benefits since they are the 
issuer of the leading international currency. Today the euro can be considered the only currency to 
have the potential of threatening the dominance of the dollar. Thinking ahead to what the 
international currency system could look like in the future it is useful to briefly reconsider the most 
prominent characteristics making a currency to be preferred on a world-wide level: 
1. real activity: size of output (internal market) and trade (share in world trade), 
2. liquidity: size and sophistication of financial markets,  
3. risk factors: monetary and exchange rate stability, stability of economic policy, and 
4. inertia (history dependency and institutional settlements). 
While real activity in terms of GDP and share in world trade does not clearly privilege any of the 
economic blocs in question an analysis of financial liquidity seems to be a more promising field of 
study. It has been shown in more detail that Europe is on the wake of moving towards highly 
developed financial markets whereas Japan is bounded to its narrow domestic markets with no 
political perspectives to establish a unified Asian market. Should the UK join EMU in the near 
future the European integration could ultimately accelerate. The prospects for providing financial 
                                                 
34 A thorough and refined analysis of the yen as an international currency has been worked out by Strube 
(2001). 
35 See Financial Times (2000). 
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liquidity in Europe are fostered by the irrevocable process of political integration. At the end, 
Europe might emerge as a political unity comparable to the US with the ability to guarantee a 
degree of stability necessary to satisfy the demands of market participants. In this respect, Japan 
has to face clear political disadvantages that will finally obstruct all efforts undertaken to promote 
the yen as an international currency. Despite great opportunities for the euro to draw level with the 
dollar in terms of size and sophistication of financial markets as well as with political stability inertia 
in combination with switching costs are likely to retard a catching up of the euro for decades. We 
suppose that the previous historical experience of only gradually changing supremacy of 
international currencies still applies. However, it must not be excluded that unexpected shocks 
may completely change the scenario outlined above. 
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